Electoral democracy index (V-Dem)
Definition
Measures to what extent the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved: rulers are responsive to citizens through electoral competition, with extensive suffrage, clean elections, free political and civil society organizations, an elected executive and, between elections, freedom of expression and an independent media. Ranges from 0 to 1.
- Formula
- 0.5·(C·L·A·S·E) + 0.5·(C/8 + L/4 + A/4 + S/8 + E/4), where C = elected officials, L = clean elections, A = freedom of association, S = suffrage and E = freedom of expression and alternative sources of information (V-Dem codebook v16, section 2.1.1).
- Unit
- index (0 to 1)
- Uncertainty
- 68% highest posterior density interval from the V-Dem measurement model (codelow and codehigh columns), roughly one standard deviation.
- License
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
Electoral democracy index (V-Dem)
- Brazil
- Argentina
- Chile
- Colombia
- Mexico
- Electoral democracy index (V-Dem)
- Source: V-Dem — Varieties of Democracy · Source version: v16 · Collected on: 2026-10-26 · License: CC-BY-SA-4.0
· Paper behind the metric: Teorell, J
Uncertainty: 68% highest posterior density interval from the V-Dem measurement model (codelow and codehigh columns), roughly one standard deviation.
Download data (CSV) · View the code: collection code · chart.ts
View the data as a table
| Year | Brazil | Argentina | Chile | Colombia | Mexico |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | 0.184 (0.166–0.203) | 0.509 (0.446–0.564) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.445 (0.388–0.501) | 0.249 (0.227–0.272) |
| 1976 | 0.186 (0.167–0.204) | 0.133 (0.119–0.145) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.445 (0.388–0.501) | 0.260 (0.236–0.287) |
| 1977 | 0.186 (0.169–0.205) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.072 (0.067–0.076) | 0.447 (0.390–0.504) | 0.276 (0.243–0.301) |
| 1978 | 0.187 (0.166–0.202) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.072 (0.067–0.075) | 0.424 (0.364–0.471) | 0.296 (0.262–0.320) |
| 1979 | 0.207 (0.185–0.227) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.074 (0.068–0.077) | 0.405 (0.345–0.449) | 0.296 (0.264–0.323) |
| 1980 | 0.251 (0.221–0.277) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.075 (0.069–0.079) | 0.409 (0.357–0.461) | 0.298 (0.269–0.329) |
| 1981 | 0.251 (0.221–0.277) | 0.071 (0.067–0.074) | 0.075 (0.069–0.079) | 0.409 (0.357–0.461) | 0.302 (0.272–0.332) |
| 1982 | 0.264 (0.232–0.289) | 0.074 (0.068–0.077) | 0.075 (0.069–0.079) | 0.409 (0.352–0.455) | 0.312 (0.277–0.342) |
| 1983 | 0.282 (0.242–0.305) | 0.267 (0.241–0.289) | 0.075 (0.069–0.079) | 0.466 (0.407–0.527) | 0.319 (0.282–0.350) |
| 1984 | 0.290 (0.251–0.319) | 0.830 (0.781–0.876) | 0.075 (0.069–0.080) | 0.455 (0.394–0.512) | 0.319 (0.282–0.350) |
| 1985 | 0.392 (0.342–0.435) | 0.829 (0.780–0.876) | 0.078 (0.071–0.082) | 0.454 (0.392–0.507) | 0.320 (0.280–0.349) |
| 1986 | 0.471 (0.413–0.522) | 0.825 (0.771–0.874) | 0.078 (0.071–0.083) | 0.448 (0.384–0.500) | 0.322 (0.278–0.349) |
| 1987 | 0.559 (0.506–0.610) | 0.827 (0.777–0.879) | 0.082 (0.074–0.088) | 0.446 (0.381–0.497) | 0.327 (0.289–0.359) |
| 1988 | 0.682 (0.623–0.751) | 0.831 (0.788–0.891) | 0.111 (0.098–0.125) | 0.443 (0.384–0.497) | 0.345 (0.302–0.382) |
| 1989 | 0.724 (0.665–0.789) | 0.828 (0.787–0.888) | 0.135 (0.122–0.152) | 0.443 (0.384–0.497) | 0.368 (0.316–0.405) |
| 1990 | 0.814 (0.772–0.868) | 0.826 (0.775–0.875) | 0.721 (0.685–0.779) | 0.473 (0.407–0.530) | 0.388 (0.337–0.435) |
| 1991 | 0.828 (0.789–0.880) | 0.829 (0.787–0.888) | 0.816 (0.775–0.879) | 0.516 (0.458–0.582) | 0.410 (0.354–0.454) |
| 1992 | 0.836 (0.794–0.883) | 0.829 (0.782–0.883) | 0.816 (0.775–0.879) | 0.558 (0.498–0.625) | 0.438 (0.382–0.490) |
| 1993 | 0.840 (0.798–0.886) | 0.829 (0.783–0.885) | 0.813 (0.766–0.872) | 0.558 (0.498–0.625) | 0.455 (0.390–0.499) |
| 1994 | 0.846 (0.809–0.896) | 0.834 (0.796–0.899) | 0.850 (0.808–0.892) | 0.558 (0.486–0.619) | 0.467 (0.408–0.524) |
| 1995 | 0.847 (0.810–0.896) | 0.833 (0.787–0.887) | 0.850 (0.808–0.892) | 0.560 (0.481–0.613) | 0.491 (0.430–0.552) |
| 1996 | 0.848 (0.810–0.895) | 0.830 (0.782–0.883) | 0.850 (0.808–0.892) | 0.554 (0.500–0.635) | 0.512 (0.455–0.575) |
| 1997 | 0.848 (0.810–0.895) | 0.829 (0.782–0.884) | 0.850 (0.808–0.892) | 0.554 (0.500–0.635) | 0.555 (0.492–0.612) |
| 1998 | 0.849 (0.810–0.895) | 0.828 (0.784–0.889) | 0.851 (0.814–0.896) | 0.546 (0.484–0.616) | 0.600 (0.541–0.663) |
| 1999 | 0.850 (0.808–0.894) | 0.828 (0.783–0.889) | 0.850 (0.809–0.891) | 0.538 (0.463–0.592) | 0.605 (0.545–0.666) |
| 2000 | 0.854 (0.818–0.900) | 0.833 (0.786–0.895) | 0.876 (0.845–0.919) | 0.550 (0.486–0.618) | 0.671 (0.615–0.735) |
| 2001 | 0.854 (0.818–0.900) | 0.833 (0.790–0.896) | 0.876 (0.845–0.919) | 0.542 (0.483–0.617) | 0.681 (0.618–0.736) |
| 2002 | 0.856 (0.821–0.903) | 0.826 (0.778–0.879) | 0.880 (0.850–0.924) | 0.534 (0.465–0.597) | 0.693 (0.634–0.750) |
| 2003 | 0.855 (0.817–0.902) | 0.807 (0.763–0.866) | 0.880 (0.850–0.924) | 0.535 (0.477–0.599) | 0.702 (0.643–0.761) |
| 2004 | 0.855 (0.817–0.902) | 0.795 (0.749–0.855) | 0.880 (0.850–0.924) | 0.537 (0.475–0.600) | 0.711 (0.653–0.772) |
| 2005 | 0.867 (0.834–0.908) | 0.793 (0.746–0.852) | 0.877 (0.846–0.921) | 0.542 (0.484–0.605) | 0.711 (0.653–0.772) |
| 2006 | 0.868 (0.834–0.909) | 0.780 (0.725–0.837) | 0.894 (0.863–0.929) | 0.571 (0.508–0.631) | 0.674 (0.614–0.732) |
| 2007 | 0.866 (0.828–0.902) | 0.781 (0.732–0.837) | 0.894 (0.863–0.929) | 0.583 (0.519–0.637) | 0.639 (0.581–0.708) |
| 2008 | 0.866 (0.828–0.902) | 0.766 (0.714–0.821) | 0.894 (0.863–0.929) | 0.585 (0.520–0.640) | 0.649 (0.593–0.717) |
| 2009 | 0.866 (0.828–0.902) | 0.756 (0.700–0.813) | 0.887 (0.854–0.923) | 0.587 (0.533–0.654) | 0.650 (0.586–0.708) |
| 2010 | 0.871 (0.836–0.908) | 0.746 (0.697–0.809) | 0.888 (0.856–0.924) | 0.624 (0.564–0.688) | 0.662 (0.604–0.727) |
| 2011 | 0.875 (0.846–0.918) | 0.749 (0.699–0.810) | 0.889 (0.856–0.924) | 0.660 (0.599–0.723) | 0.662 (0.599–0.723) |
| 2012 | 0.871 (0.835–0.912) | 0.763 (0.713–0.818) | 0.893 (0.867–0.934) | 0.661 (0.599–0.728) | 0.650 (0.595–0.716) |
| 2013 | 0.873 (0.841–0.914) | 0.772 (0.727–0.837) | 0.894 (0.865–0.931) | 0.669 (0.609–0.734) | 0.623 (0.554–0.679) |
| 2014 | 0.873 (0.844–0.917) | 0.777 (0.738–0.847) | 0.893 (0.867–0.937) | 0.677 (0.618–0.741) | 0.621 (0.558–0.687) |
| 2015 | 0.861 (0.831–0.908) | 0.765 (0.720–0.827) | 0.886 (0.854–0.921) | 0.681 (0.630–0.753) | 0.643 (0.586–0.712) |
| 2016 | 0.781 (0.735–0.830) | 0.751 (0.699–0.812) | 0.886 (0.854–0.921) | 0.682 (0.625–0.753) | 0.643 (0.580–0.702) |
| 2017 | 0.774 (0.728–0.825) | 0.751 (0.698–0.805) | 0.889 (0.857–0.925) | 0.680 (0.624–0.750) | 0.638 (0.583–0.703) |
| 2018 | 0.749 (0.703–0.810) | 0.780 (0.737–0.839) | 0.870 (0.838–0.912) | 0.666 (0.608–0.727) | 0.675 (0.616–0.741) |
| 2019 | 0.691 (0.634–0.745) | 0.779 (0.733–0.836) | 0.829 (0.790–0.874) | 0.651 (0.594–0.710) | 0.684 (0.627–0.752) |
| 2020 | 0.699 (0.653–0.767) | 0.797 (0.751–0.850) | 0.837 (0.798–0.879) | 0.643 (0.581–0.700) | 0.664 (0.610–0.731) |
| 2021 | 0.690 (0.643–0.751) | 0.796 (0.748–0.849) | 0.841 (0.797–0.880) | 0.654 (0.596–0.714) | 0.624 (0.567–0.692) |
| 2022 | 0.699 (0.644–0.753) | 0.831 (0.791–0.880) | 0.833 (0.791–0.875) | 0.696 (0.637–0.753) | 0.584 (0.521–0.644) |
| 2023 | 0.790 (0.738–0.841) | 0.838 (0.800–0.889) | 0.836 (0.795–0.881) | 0.711 (0.654–0.772) | 0.548 (0.487–0.608) |
| 2024 | 0.799 (0.753–0.857) | 0.721 (0.670–0.780) | 0.845 (0.808–0.897) | 0.698 (0.636–0.756) | 0.496 (0.439–0.558) |
| 2025 | 0.784 (0.733–0.839) | 0.690 (0.625–0.743) | 0.839 (0.802–0.893) | 0.679 (0.627–0.745) | 0.469 (0.418–0.525) |
Criticisms of the metric
- The weights and the half-additive, half-multiplicative combination are the authors' choices: a compromise between allowing compensation across components and punishing the "weakest link". Other choices would change countries' positions.
- Based on expert assessments aggregated by a statistical model. A recent debate asks whether the global trend of democratic backsliding shows up in objective indicators (such as incumbent electoral performance) or may reflect coder bias (Little and Meng, 2024; reply in Knutsen et al., 2024).
- Absolute values are not comparable across V-Dem versions: each version re-estimates the whole series. Compare values from the same version only.
- Intervals are wide; small differences between adjacent years or countries may be within the model's uncertainty.
References
- Teorell, J., Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S., & Skaaning, S.-E. (2018). Measuring polyarchy across the globe, 1900–2017. Studies in Comparative International Development, 54(1) [2019], 71–95. doi:10.1007/s12116-018-9268-z
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S., Hicken, A., et al. (2011). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: a new approach. Perspectives on Politics, 9(2), 247–267. doi:10.1017/S1537592711000880
- Little, A. T., & Meng, A. (2024). Measuring democratic backsliding. PS: Political Science & Politics, 57(2), 149–161. doi:10.1017/S104909652300063X
- Knutsen, C. H., Marquardt, K. L., Seim, B., Coppedge, M., Edgell, A. B., et al. (2024). Conceptual and measurement issues in assessing democratic backsliding. PS: Political Science & Politics, 57(2), 162–177. doi:10.1017/S104909652300077X
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., et al. (2026). V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v16. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds26